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  The banking system constitutes one of the most essential elements of the 
market economy. A well-functioning banking sector can play an especially 
important role in the reconstruction of postcommunist economies. Fundamental 
changes in the operating principles of this sector can stimulate and accelerate 
changes in the entire economic system. The delay of transformations in this 
sphere can cause further delays in the broader processes of change, or even bring 
them to a halt. 
  The reform of the banking system must constitute an important element of 
the marketizing reforms undertaken in the countries of the former Soviet Union. 
No program of macroeconomic stabilization (including the reduction of inflation) 
can be executed in the absence of well-developed central bank mechanisms for 
the conduct of monetary policy. Moreover, the realization of structural changes 
in the economy and programs for enterprise restructuring and privatization are 
strongly linked with changes in the operating principles of commercial banks. 
The first condition necessary for the initiation of reforms in the banking system is 
the adoption of changes in relevant legislation enabling the central bank and 
commercial banks to undertake activities corresponding to their new tasks and 
roles as defined by the principles of well-functioning market economies. 
  Based on the experience of reforming countries up to this point in time, 
one can distinguish two distinct phases in the realization of banking sector 
reform. In the first, it is necessary to introduce a two-tiered banking system. The 
central bank is made responsible for the conduct of monetary policy aimed at the 
curbing of inflation and the stabilization of the currency. The commercial banks 
attain independence in their activities, and the old and new clients of those 
institutions are allowed freedom in their choice of a bank. At the same time, a 
liberal licensing policy is introduced regulating the opening of new banks. The 
problems arising in the second stage concern the credit portfolios of old and new 
commercial banks. Their gradual solution requires simultaneously changes in the 
credit policy of the banks as well as the restructuring of the enterprises indebted 
to them. At this point, the strengthening of banking supervision by the central 
bank and the introduction into practice of international standards of risk appraisal 
and commercial banking activity become especially important. 
  Kyrgyzstan is the most advanced state in Central Asia in the area of 
radical reforms aimed at the reconstruction of the economic system. These 
reforms concern the entire banking system and its role in the transformation 
process. The purpose of this study is to outline the changes which have occurred 
thus far in the Kyrgyz banking system as well as to point out the chief problems 
which have arisen during the course of these reforms.1 
                                              
1 Information on the subject of the banking system was gathered during interviews in the central bank 
(with the vice president of the bank and the president of the methodology department). We obtained 
additional data at the offices of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank representatives. K. Kloc 
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1. The structure of the banking system 
  The reform of the banking system in Kyrgyzstan began in June 1991 with 
the passage of the Law on the State Bank and the Law on Banks and Banking 
Activity. The most important result of these two pieces of legislation was the 
creation of a two-tiered system of banking institutions. At the same time the 
former republican branch of the State Bank of the USSR was transformed into 
the National Bank of Kyrgyzstan (NBK), which was at that time subject to 
parliamentary control. 
  The currently binding Law on the National Bank of the Republic of 
Kyrgyzstan and the Law on Banks and Banking Activity in the Republic of 
Kyrgyzstan were passed in December 1992. The assistance of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) was made use of in drawing up both laws. The model for 
their formulation was the banking legislation of Estonia. The experience of other 
countries, including Poland, was also taken into account. These laws ensured the 
central bank complete independence from government and parliament. 
  In mid-1994 20 banks were functioning in Kyrgyzstan in the form of 
joint-stock companies (Russian abbreviation: AKB) or commercial banks 
(abbreviation: KB). These included the three largest state banks, which had been 
converted into joint-stock companies in which the enterprises financed by them 
up to that point became the shareholders. Thus, they simply represented a 
continuation of the former state banks, financing particular sectors and branches 
of the economy. Specifically, these banks are AK Kyrgyzagroprombank (Joint-
Stock Commercial Kyrgyz Agricultural-Industrial Bank), AK 
Kyrgyzpromstroibank (Joint-Stock Commercial Kyrgyz Industrial-Construction 
Bank), and AKB Kyrgyzstan (which had previously financed chiefly light and 
manufacturing industry). These banks were responsible in mid-1994 for 85 
percent of the value of all credits and loans distributed in the entire commercial 
banking sector. From the outset of their independent activity (at the end of 1991) 
they have been engaged in increasing the number of their  branches. Thus, in the 
course of two years, Kyrgyzagroprombank increased the number of its branches 
from 45 to 51, thus attaining the largest number of branches. 
Kyrgyzpromstroibank created seven new branches and by mid-1994 had 27, and 
AKB Kyrgyzstan increased the number of its branches from 19 to 25. The fourth 
largest bank is to be created on the foundation of former savings institutions (so-
                                                                                                                                     
Interviews were also conducted at three commercial banks. Among these was one of the largest 
commercial banks - AKB Kyrgyzstan. Legislation concerning the central bank and the banking system as 
well as several instructions of the central bank were also collected. 
From the information thus gathered, a picture of the early activities in the creation of the foundation 
of a banking system well-suited to the demands of a market economy emerges. At the same time the 
comparison of relevant legislation with the information gathered in the course of interviews shows a large 
discrepancy between the provisions of the new laws and the actual principles by which commercial banks 
are still managed. This results from the fact that the banking system is in the first stage of transition from 
the operating principles in effect during the period of central planning to those of the market economy. The Banking System in Kyrgyzstan 
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called "sbergkasy"). It has the largest number of branches (54) but by mid-1994 
did not yet have a status affirmed by the central bank and was not able to fulfil 
the function of a commercial bank. The problems of this bank are connected with 
the transfer of its funds to Russia in the final phase of the existence of the Soviet 
Union and difficulties with their recovery. At this time it held 85 percent of the 
savings of private individuals, which, however, constituted only 15 percent of the 
value of all deposits in the banking system (held by both individual persons and 
enterprises). 
  Besides the four large banks mentioned above, 16 financial institutions 
had been created. Most of them (11, to be precise) were created by central state 
institutions (one of the banks, for example, was created from the account clearing 
office of the Ministry of Construction) or state enterprises from certain branches 
of the economy (for example, the founders of AKB Kyrgyzvneshbank were 
enterprises engaged in export activity, and the shareholders of AKB 
Kyrgyzenergobank include power plants). Very often the largest and most 
powerful enterprises of the republic are the founders and shareholders of several 
new banks. Three banks were also created with the participation of foreign 
capital (for example, AKB Adil, with Swiss capital, and KB Chen-Fen Ltd., with 
capital from Hong Kong). In most cases the new banks are in the first stage of 
their development. An indirect measure of their activity could be seen in the fact 
that 10 of them still have no branches besides the head office (see table 1). At the 
same time most of the banks (13 to be precise) have obtained a license for the 
conducting of operations in foreign currencies. 
2. Banking law 
  In their essential content the banking laws passed in Kyrgyzstan mirror all 
elements of the rules and principles contained in the Polish legislation. However, 
they are less specific and much less precisely formulated. 
  In the law on the central bank of December 1992 the independence of the 
NBK from the government and state authorities is defined. One of the first 
provisions contained in the law reads: "The Republic of Kyrgyzstan does not 
carry responsibility for the obligations of the Bank of Kyrgyzstan. The Bank of 
Kyrgyzstan is not responsible for the obligations of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan" 
(article 1 item 4). Moreover, several items later we find a provision reading as 
follows: "The Bank of Kyrgyzstan independently organizes and executes its 
activities. The interference of state organs in the solution of problems designated 
in this law as the domain of the Bank of Kyrgyzstan is not permissible" (article 3 
item 1). The capital base of the bank was also defined in the law with the 
stipulation that it cannot be reduced, only increased with the agreement of the 
government (article 5 item 1). Similarly, the rule was established that 30 percent 
of its yearly profit remains in the bank's disposition and the rest is turned over to 
the state budget (article 6 items 2 and 3). K. Kloc 
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  These provisions resulted - as the vice president of the central bank 
emphasized in an interview - from the necessity of additional guarantees of the 
bank's independence from the government. In his opinion, banks in Central Asia 
are under the special influence of state authorities. In Kyrgyzstan the new 
position of the central bank was made possible by the passage of the Law on the 
National Bank and additionally by the government's signing of a memorandum 
with the IMF. These actions significantly reduced the pressure of the government 
on the central bank. On the other hand, commercial banks rather than the central 
bank are now subject to attempts by the government to exert influence upon the 
banking system. 
  The basic tasks of the central bank as defined in the legislation include: 
the assurance of the stabilization of the currency, the conduct of monetary policy, 
the defense of the interests of debtors and depositors, the assurance of 
competition in the banking system, and the supervision of the fulfilment of 
banking law. 
  Having been strengthened by the legislative provisions, the position of the 
central bank with respect to the government was weakened by regulations 
concerning the monetary policy conducted by the bank. The rules of this policy 
must be agreed upon with the government and in the case of lack of agreement 
between the bank and the government the decisive institution is the Supreme 
Council of the Republic, which by legislative means may bring about a change in 
the staffing of the central bank. No less the law forbidding the use of monetary 
emissions for the purpose of financing the state budget deficit and among the 
instruments regulating the quantity of money in circulation 
exchange/replace/mention among other things a change in the quantity of credits 
extended by the central bank and the interest rates charged on those credits, 
changes in the norms regarding the obligatory reserves of the commercial banks 
as well as the setting of minimal interest rates on deposits (article 9). On the other 
hand the bank can extend short term credits to the state budget (for up to 6 
months) the total value of which may not exceed 5 percent of GDP. 
  The law rather generally defines the relations of the central bank with the 
commercial banks (permissible operations, clearing of accounts, supervision of 
commercial bank activities, the setting of reserve requirements and various 
norms). 
  The president of the central bank is appointed to a five-year term of office 
by the president upon the approval of the candidate by the Supreme Council of 
the Republic. The staff of the administration of the bank is specially regulated in 
the legislation. The influence of branch structures is sanctioned by a provision on 
the participation of representatives of various branches of the economy in the 
administration of the bank. 
  The Law on Banks and Banking Activity in the Republic of Kyrgyzstan 
regulates the organization and activity of banks. As emphasized in the The Banking System in Kyrgyzstan 
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introduction to that document, these regulations must correspond to 
"international banking system standards." It allows for the creation of banks with 
various ownership structures, including banks with the participation of private 
and foreign capital. The law contains a provision guaranteeing their 
independence within the boundaries set by the law. The interference of executive 
organs of the state in the management and decisions connected with banking 
activity is, in the intent of the law, not permissible. Banks can join unions, 
associations, and holdings under the condition that they will not use these 
organizational structures for the purpose of restricting competition and 
monopolizing the market for banking services. 
  In the second section of the law, in which the rules for the creation of 
banks are defined, a provision states that the minimum required starting capital of 
a bank cannot be drawn from budgetary sources or borrowed on credit or security 
(article 9 point 3). Among the documents required when applying for a banking 
license is an "economic justification for the creation of the bank." The finding 
that there is a lack  of purpose in the creation of a bank can be the basis for the 
refusal to grant a license. 
  The third section, devoted to the topic of organization of bank activities, 
contains unusually laconic formulations. Many items consist simply of a 
reference to other laws or to "international banking practice." The supervision of 
banking activity is to be carried out by the Bank of Kyrgyzstan and by the 
auditors of the tax collection authority. Article 32 contains the obligation of an 
annual audit. However, no concrete organization is designated as being 
authorized to undertake such activity; reference is simply made to other laws in 
force in Kyrgyzstan. With regard to the subject of auditing, it has been assumed 
in the central bank that one firm will be chosen for this purpose which will be 
awarded the status of a plenipotentiary of the bank. 
  In sum both laws leave a rather wide field of interpretation, and many 
matters have been left for future regulation and to the discretion of the central 
bank. Taking into consideration the mechanisms of bank functioning which 
operated for decades during the era of central planning as well as the resulting 
habits of bank employees, this situation could in practice lead to the survival of 
the earlier principles of activity. To effectively counter such developments, it will 
be necessary to institute a series of amendments to the banking law to the extent 
that problems arise resulting from the practice of the functioning of the entire 
system. 
  The first amendment to the law on the banking system is currently under 
consideration. It concerns such matters as the limitation of the right to hold 
deposits  to banks alone (with certain defined exceptions), a more precise 
formulation of the conditions for the granting of licenses, access for courts and 
tax inspection authorities to information about bank accounts, and an increase in 
the strictness of the conditions regarding the liquidation of banks. One of the new K. Kloc 
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planned regulations forbids a single economic agent to be a major shareholder in 
several banks simultaneously. One can already predict that the planned 
amendment will not solve the growing problems of the banking system. Further 
changes in the law will be necessary which make precise many unclear points 
contained in the currently binding legislation. 
3. The introduction of the national currency 
  Beginning in January 1992, a radical price reform was initiated in 
Kyrgyzstan mirroring the policy executed in Russia. Member states of the CIS in 
the ruble zone attempted to carry out independent monetary policies. The lack of 
coordination of activities and emission policies led to a lack of stability in the 
entire ruble zone. Under these conditions the decision of the Russian Federation 
on 1 July, 1992, to centralize clearings of the central bank of Russia with the 
central banks of other republics meant in practice the introduction of separate 
monetary systems. The Bank of Russia, in becoming the sole emitter of the ruble, 
subordinated the national banks of other states of the CIS, rendering it impossible 
for them to carry on independent monetary policies. 
  In this situation, the most important financial operation carried out in 
Kyrgyzstan during the period of market reforms was the exit from the ruble zone 
and the introduction of a national currency. The goal of this operation was the 
assumption of complete control over, and responsibility for, its monetary policy 
by the Republic of Kyrgyzstan. Preparations for the introduction of the som were 
begun in 1992. Technical aid was provided to the Kyrgyz government by the 
IMF and the World Bank. These activities were linked with the planned 
macroeconomic stabilization program. 
  In the second half of 1992, the economic situation of Kyrgyzstan 
underwent a significant worsening. This was caused by, among other things, 
significant growth in the prices of imported energy resources, grains, steel, and 
wood. It was also impossible to isolate the country from the inflationary 
influence of the ruble zone. There was an increase in the transfer of the republic's 
funds to other states of the CIS caused by emigration. The fall in production was 
accompanied by a weakening of financial discipline of economic agents and the 
weakness of the tax system. In this situation the creation of conditions rendering 
possible the conduct of an independent monetary policy, the reduction of 
inflation, and stabilization of the macroeconomic situation demanded the 
introduction of an independent national currency. 
  At the beginning of 1993 the Kyrgyz government informed the republics 
of the former Soviet Union of its intention to introduce a new independent 
currency. In May, 1993, the parliament approved the project and created a special 
committee to undertake decisions regarding the introduction of the som. Several 
days later - on Friday, 7 May, 1993 - it was announced that as of Monday, 10 
May, the new national currency would be introduced into circulation. Exchange The Banking System in Kyrgyzstan 
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would be carried out until 14 May at a rate of 1 som to 200 rubles. Monetary 
funds deposited in savings institutions ("sbergkasy") were exchanged at a rate of 
one som to 150 rubles. No limitation was placed on the number of rubles 
convertible into soms. 
  The monetary exchanges carried out in commercial banks, branches of 
"spergkasy" and special points set up in workplaces. In total, adding the 
purchases carried out by the population in shops to the direct exchanges of rubles 
for soms, the authorities collected only ca. 25 percent of the estimated number of 
rubles in circulation (i.e., 14 billion rubles out of about 53 billion rubles). This 
low figure  illustrates the low level of the populace's confidence in the new 
national currency. Moreover, the de facto open borders with the former republics 
of the Soviet Union, where rubles continued to be the accepted currency, made 
possible the use of unexchanged rubles in the future. However, beginning with 
the end of May, the som became the accepted medium of exchange within 
Kyrgyzstan for all current transactions. 
4. The monetary policy of the central bank 
  Until the end of 1993 the flow of refinancing credit to commercial banks 
was in practice the only source of their credit funds and the main instrument of 
the central bank's influence on the money supply. Before the introduction of the 
som, the central bank - through the mediation of commercial banks and on the 
basis of instructions from the parliament and the government - extended this 
credit for specific purposes or to specific sectors of the economy. At the same 
time the interest rate on these credits was decidedly negative. In the first half of 
1992 the nominal interest rate amounted to 12 percent and increased in the 
second half of the year to 50 percent annually. This state was maintained up until 
the introduction of the new currency. Besides the low interest rates there existed 
additional preferences for the agricultural sector (where the interest rate 
amounted to 30 percent annually) and the financing of the state budget (interest 
rate of 8 percent annually). At the same time the interest rate on deposits 
remained far below the inflation rate. This caused a withdrawal of deposits by 
enterprises as well as by individual persons. 
  Attempts to change this situation began to be made at the time of the 
introduction of the national currency. The interest rate on refinancing credit grew 
twofold to 100 percent and the proposed interest rate on deposits in banks 
fluctuated between 60 and 80 percent. This jump was intended to harden credit 
policy and encourage depositors to hold their funds in banks. Nevertheless, the 
process of withdrawal of deposits from banks was not halted, a fact which was 
linked with the lack of confidence in the som and the continuing negative real 
interest rate. 
  Following the introduction of the som the chief goal of the money and 
credit policy of the NBK was the achievement of price stabilization and the K. Kloc 
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assurance of a stable exchange rate for the Kyrgyz som. However, the worsening 
of the economic situation in the second half of 1993 (which resulted from export 
difficulties, the fall in production and financial discipline, the lack of 
coordination between monetary and fiscal policy, and structural changes in the 
economy) caused the central bank to use emissions as a means of supporting the 
state budget - which was in a difficult situation - and enterprises in worsening 
condition. The central bank's basic instrument for influencing the money quantity 
and the general amount of credit in the banking system continued to be 
centralized credits for commercial banks and the government. 
  In 1993 60 percent of all credit funds of the central bank were used either 
to satisfy the needs of the government (almost 14 percent) or used in the 
economy according to the instructions of the government (46 percent). Credits 
for the government were extended on preferential terms (at interest rates of 10 
percent or 60 percent interest rates, whereas interest rates in the credit auction 
markets had grown from 100 percent to reach levels of over 200 percent). 58 
percent of refinancing credits granted directly to the economy were obtained by 
agriculture and the agricultural processing industry, 8 percent by industry, 9 
percent by trade and services, 9 percent for the purchase of oil and 4 percent for 
the development of the energy system. 
  The share of refinancing credit in the total sum of credit in 1993 
approached 74 percent. The three largest commercial banks were the chief 
recipients of these credits. In Kyrgyzagroprombank they made up almost 94 
percent of the entire sum of the bank's credit funds; in Kyrgyzpromstroibank 66 
percent, and in AKB Kyrgyzstan 63 percent (see table 1). The high share of such 
credits in the case of these banks was due to the execution of government 
instructions. 
  In addition to extending preferential and specially designated credits, the 
central bank attempted to control the market rate of interest. Irregular credit 
auctions were organized for this purpose. In 1993 nine such auctions were 
organized, at which commercial banks bought somewhat over 8 percent of the 
total value of the entire refinancing credit (see table 2). At the first credit auction 
following the introduction of the new currency, held in May, 1993, the interest 
rate was set at 110 percent. In September of that year it reached 190 percent, and 
by October it had grown to 260 percent. The next credit auctions were held in the 
spring of 1994. Between October, 1993, and April, 1994, the central bank 
extended refinancing credit exclusively in accordance with centralized 
government instructions (see table 3). The simultaneous fall in production and 
expansion of credit caused inflation to grow to a rate of over 40 percent monthly. 
This was one of the reasons for the non-fulfilment of the settlements contained in 
the agreement with the IMF and the subsequent withholding by the IMF of the 
next aid tranche. The Banking System in Kyrgyzstan 
  - 11 -  CASE Foundation 
  At the beginning of 1994 the central bank significantly reduced the scale 
of its crediting of the economy. A presidential decree forbade the extension of 
preferential credits. The organization of credit auctions was resumed. After their 
resumption in April of this year the interest rate on refinancing credit fell to 195 
percent and later, as the monthly rate of inflation fell below 10 percent, was 
reduced further within a half year to 120 percent. 
  In connection with the worsening financial situation of enterprises, the 
proportion of non-performing loans in commercial bank portfolios grew. For 
commercial banks this meant the impossibility of repaying to the central bank 
refinancing credits acquired earlier. At the end of 1993 the overdue debts of 
commercial banks to the central bank amounted to 60 percent of the total value 
of credits extended to commercial banks in that year. In practice this meant the 
increase in refinancing credit extended in that year by nearly 600 million soms. 
  Changes in minimum reserve requirements constituted a further 
instrument of central bank influence on the scale of the commercial banks' credit 
action. In 1993 the reserve requirement was raised from 15 to 20 percent of 
deposits. At the same time the central bank paid the commercial banks a market 
rate of interest on these reserves. In 1994, intending to reduce the credit activity 
of commercial banks, raised the minimum reserve requirement to 30 percent of 
deposits of all types. 
  In the search for noninflationary methods of financing the budget deficit, 
the central bank in 1993 began to sell state bonds at auctions. At first only 
commercial banks were permitted to buy them. They were induced to do so by 
the introduction of the requirement that, in order to obtain refinancing credit 
extended on the credit auction market, banks would have to hold 10 percent of 
the value of the loan as collateral in the form of state bonds. From the beginning 
of 1994 individual persons and enterprises were also permitted to purchase state 
bonds. 
  Together with the introduction of the new currency regulations were 
established concerning the circulation of foreign currencies. Restrictions on 
transactions carried out in foreign currencies which had been binding up to that 
point were lifted. At the same time, due to the shortage of foreign currency 
reserves, a flexible exchange rate was established on the interbank market. 
Commercial banks were allowed to purchase foreign currency at weekly auctions 
organized by the central bank. The auctions were organized as follows: The NBK 
announced the amount of dollars to be sold. The commercial banks announced 
the amount they intended to purchase and at the same time proposed the rate at 
which they intended to purchase them. The exchange rate was then fixed by 
adjusting the rate until the quantity demanded by the commercial banks matched 
the sum the central bank intended to sell. In 1994 enterprises and private 
exchange offices were also permitted to take part in the auctions. K. Kloc 
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  The dollar exchange rate thus established stood between 4 and 5 soms to 
the dollar from mid-May until mid-June. In August, 1993, it rose to 6 and then to 
7 soms to the dollar. By the end of 1993 the rate stood between 8 and 9 soms to 
the dollar. During the first half of 1994 it rose to 12 soms to the dollar, after 
which it began to fall slowly. 
  The constant growth in the dollar exchange rate was occasioned by the 
worsening of the economic situation, uncertainty regarding the success of the 
reforms, and the shortage of foreign currency reserves. At the same time the rate 
established in foreign exchange offices (actually the "street" rate) was higher 
than the rate established at the central bank's auctions by 0.5 to 1 som per dollar. 
Taking into consideration the economic crisis prevailing in Kyrgyzstan during 
this entire period it must be emphasized that the introduction of the new currency 
and the establishment of its convertibility were carried out successfully. 
5. Commercial bank credit policy 
  The commercial banking sector in Kyrgyzstan arose while banking 
legislation of the Soviet Union was still in effect. The 1990 Law on Banks and 
Banking Activity in the RSFSR and the Law on the Central Bank of the RSFSR 
of the same year made possible the creation of commercial banks, which were 
created at first through the commercialization of regional branches of specialized 
banks. In this manner republican bank branches were transformed into 
independent banking units (e.g., Kyrgyzagroprombank, Kyrgyzpromstroibank). 
At the same time they were converted into joint-stock companies in which their 
previous clients (state enterprises and  collective farms) became shareholders. 
  Thus, on the basis of Soviet law new banks with various forms of 
ownership began to be established. The low capital requirements for their 
creation (the low level of these requirements resulted especially from the 
depreciation due to the growth of inflation) caused a rapid growth in the number 
of commercial banks in the former Soviet Union. 
  Thus, in Kyrgyzstan about ten commercial banks had already been created  
before the announcement of independence. Their founders as a rule were large 
industrial enterprises. When independence was declared and the nation's own 
banking legislation adopted, the existing banks were registered anew. The new 
Kyrgyz legislation on the conditions for establishing a new bank and acquiring a 
license did not differ much from the Soviet legislation. On this basis, from the 
beginning of 1993 until mid-1994, the central bank awarded six new licenses for 
banking activity. The only essential change occurred with the introduction of the 
national currency, when the required minimum starting capital was increased to 
one million soms, an amount many times greater than corresponding minimum in 
Russia. At the same time the required minimum starting capital for foreign banks 
was set at one million dollars. The NBK required already existing commercial 
banks to increase their starting capital. Nevertheless, not all commercial banks The Banking System in Kyrgyzstan 
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raised their starting capital to the required amount of one million soms (see table 
1). Moreover, the required minimum of starting capital established in mid-June 
was depreciated as a result of inflation. For this reason, starting from the 
beginning of 1994 the central bank raised the required minimum to 5 million 
soms. As a result the absolute majority of commercial banks have a much lower 
level of starting capital (between one and three million soms) and dispose of a 
small capital base, and thus operate on the border of very high risk. 
  Commercial banks in Kyrgyzstan can be separated into two categories. 
The first is made up of three large banks created on the basis of former state 
banks which financed specific spheres of the economy. Up until now they have 
been under the special care of the central bank and the government due to their 
crediting of the majority of large enterprises in the republic (for example the 
defense industry and enterprises chiefly providing supplies for other republics of 
the former Soviet Union). In accordance with the instructions of the government 
and the parliament, these banks have higher limits for the acquisition of 
refinancing credit than the other banks. Thus, for example, Kyrgyzagroprombank 
received in the first half of 1993 almost 40 percent of all funds designated for 
refinancing credits by the central bank. This proportion was continued even after 
the introduction of credit auction markets. The second largest bank, 
Kyrgyzpromstroibank, received at that same time over 15 percent of all 
refinancing credit. The third largest bank, AKB Kyrgyzstan, received almost 10 
percent. These credits were allocated in 1993 on preferential terms. The 
significant decline or complete halt in production by these banks' creditors 
(accompanied by a lack of restructuring activity) led to the inability of those 
enterprises to continue to make payments on their loans. Consequently, the 
situation of the three largest banks drastically worsened in 1993. An indirect 
expression of this was the cessation of publication of their balances. According 
to the evaluation of specialists, the ones in the worst situation were the largest 
(Kyrgyzagroprombank) and second largest (Kyrgyzpromstroibank) banks. 
  The third largest bank, AKB Kyrgyzstan, has until now financed 
agriculture and the processing of agricultural products. The bank is a joint-stock 
company. In 1990, 600 shareholders formed the bank's capital base (these 
shareholders were chiefly state enterprises and collective farms which had been 
clients of the bank previously). In the following years the capital base of the bank 
was the highest of any bank operating in Kyrgyzstan. By the end of 1993 it 
amounted to nearly 25 million soms. However, the rate of growth of capital 
remained below the rate of inflation. As a result, the real value of the capital base 
fell by half in 1993. 
  As a result of its administratively determined specialization, this bank was 
also involved in the crediting of the new private sector. In 1993 credits for the 
private sector rose from 10 to 15 percent of the loans distributed. They were 
distributed chiefly to firms and persons mainly occupied in trade; such clients 
currently represent 25 percent of the bank's clientele. The remaining funds were K. Kloc 
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engaged in state enterprises and collective farms. From mid-1993 the interest rate 
on credits distributed (mainly to new clients) followed the rates set at the credit 
auctions of the central bank. Because the interest on deposits in the bank (as in 
the other banks) remained far below the rate of inflation, the process of their 
outflow continued. 
  The formal procedure of credit allocation at AKB Kyrgyzstan includes the 
requirement that the potential borrower provide the bank with information about 
his firm, the character of its activities, and the nature of its contracts. In practice, 
however, the majority of credits allocated in 1993 were either distributed to old 
clients (who are moreover shareholders of the bank and thus enjoy certain 
preferential conditions) or in accordance with government instructions. Only 
from the beginning of 1993 did the bank begin to require securities from its old 
and new borrowers. In the case of state enterprises the property of the enterprise 
(or some part of it) constitutes the collateral. However, in the case of new clients, 
mainly private, there are the additional requirements that the value of the 
enterprise property constituting the collateral must exceed the value of the loan 
and that the loan can be insured only by one of a group of insurance firms 
recognized by the bank. 
  At the same time it is admitted in the bank that its general strategic goal at 
present is simply survival, as the bank's balance has become negative. Proposals 
now exist to double the capital base. This information indicates, however, that 
the bank's condition is not good; additionally, estimates of the share of bad and 
doubtful credits in the bank's loan portfolio (in mid-1993 the proportion was 
estimated to be only 10 percent) are understated, and that share growing 
constantly. 
  The second group of banks is made up of those which were created after 
1989 on the basis of Soviet legislation and those which received their licenses 
from the Kyrgyz central bank. There are 16 of these banks, in various situations. 
The best include AKB Kyrgyzvneshbank and AKB Kurulushbank. The first 
received its license in mid-1992. Its starting capital was contributed by over a 
dozen large enterprises, including the four largest enterprises in Kyrgyzstan. At 
the beginning of 1994 the starting capital of this bank amounted to over 15 
million soms and was the second largest starting capital, after that of AKB 
Kyrgyzstan. At the same time the most essential fact was that Kyrgyzvneshbank 
increased its starting capital sufficiently to compensate for inflation in 1993. It 
was thus one of only three banks in Kyrgyzstan which did not undergo de facto 
decapitalization. 
  Deposits of individual persons and enterprises exceeded slightly the 
amount of starting capital by the end of 1993. As a result, over half of the funds 
which this bank distributed as credit were acquired from the central bank in the 
form of refinancing credit. These credits were distributed to various units 
engaged in import and export activity. Loans denominated in foreign currencies The Banking System in Kyrgyzstan 
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(chiefly dollars and rubles) constituted about 10 percent of the value of credits 
distributed. 
  The credit application form at Kyrgyzvneshbank requires the potential 
borrower to supply more information about his financial situation, the contracts 
he has concluded, and the loans he has obtained from other banks than any 
comparable document used in other banks. A business plan is also required. 
Decisions on credit are made collectively by the bank's management. At the same 
time it is admitted that credits are extended to the bank's shareholders on 
preferential terms, meaning in practice a lower interest rate. 
  The second commercial bank in a good financial situation is 
Kurulushbank. It is the oldest of the new banks operating in Kyrgyzstan. It 
obtained its license in 1989 in Moscow and was registered in December 1991 by 
the NBK. It was created by about 60 state enterprises later transformed into joint-
stock companies. During its five years of activity the bank attempted to increase 
its capital base by organizing three emissions of new shares. In this manner over 
100 small private enterprises became shareholders of the bank. By the end of 
1993 the starting capital amounted to 2.5 million soms. In connection with the de 
facto decapitalization of own funds which occurred in 1993 a fourth emission is 
planned, intended to raise 7.5 million soms. 
  Selected old shareholders intend to buy the new shares. This is due to the 
nature of a conflict between the initial group of shareholders and the newer 
shareholders. The new shareholders (chiefly small private enterprises), who have 
obtained a controlling packet of shares, intend to replace the management of the 
bank. They believe that the bank should be engaging in bolder and, in their 
opinion, more profitable operations. The current management and the older 
group of shareholders, however, believe that the operations proposed by the new 
shareholders are too risky and border on illegality. A change in the management 
and strategy of the bank was rendered impossible by the temporary acquisition 
by the management of a part of the shares held by the group of new private 
shareholders. These were shares acquired by the use of leverage, using credits 
extended by the bank. The overdue status of payments on some of these loans 
allowed the bank to reclaim some shares from their owners. The latter intend to 
pay back all loans as quickly as possible in order to reclaim their shares. As a 
result the emission of new shares and their distribution to the older group of 
shareholders is intended to render impossible a change in the bank's strategy and 
to maintain the current management. 
  The management, which has been in place now for five years, believes 
that Kurulushbank should remain a relatively small but universal bank. It is 
emphasized that it has earned the trust of its clients and is regarded as reliable by 
well-known Western banks. An expression of the latter was the positive audit of 
the bank by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the K. Kloc 
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extension of a line of credit for the support and development of private 
enterprise. 
  In mid-1994 the bank, through its head office and three branches, was 
serving about 1500 clients. Over 300 enterprises kept deposits in the bank, of 
which one half were kept in foreign currency accounts (denominated in dollar 
and rubles). From the beginning of 1994, the bank has attempted to attract the 
savings of individual persons. It has not been able to obtain time deposits, 
however, as a result of the uncertain situation with regard to inflation in 1994. 
The interest rate on a-vista accounts was set at 120 percent; additionally, interest 
was capitalized monthly. This was rather cautious in comparison with the 
activities of other banks, which were paying interest on a-vista accounts of up to 
300 percent. In spite of this difference Kurulushbank was able to attract over 3 
million soms' worth of deposits from individual persons during the course of the 
first six months of 1994. In the opinion of the bank's management this was an 
expression of confidence in the stable and strong position of Kurulushbank in the 
Kyrgyz banking system. 
  The credit policy of the bank is equally cautious. Credit represents about 
one third of the assets of the bank. Most of the bank's funds are engaged in its 
foreign operations. In mid-1994 the value of credit amounted to about 12 million 
soms. According to the management's assessment only 5 percent of these credits 
are subject to late payments. 
  During the last two years the bank has instituted more rigorous conditions 
for obtaining credit. In credit applications information about the financial 
situation of the applicant is required more and more frequently. Decisions on 
granting of credit are made collectively, by a minimum of three persons from the 
management, and the freedom of the branches is significantly limited. Until mid-
1993 the bank required the insurance of the loan by one of four insurance firms 
recognized by the bank. However, along with the worsening situation of debtors 
and the automatically reduced ability of the insurance firms to pay, the bank has 
ceased to require this form of security. Since the beginning of 1994 it has 
accepted collateral only in the form of liens on goods, transportation vehicles and 
buildings. It recognizes the guarantees of only two banks (one of which is 
Vneshekonombank). 
  Credits are usually extended either for a period of three months (so-called 
trade credits) or six months (so-called production credits). In 1994 the annual rate 
of interest on such credits lies between 250 and 270 percent. In Kurulushbank 
shareholders continue to be granted preferential terms. Initially they were 
allowed to take credits for up to six months without any security or interest 
charges. In 1994 a rule was introduced that the shares held constitute a security 
for the loan and that an interest rate of 10 percent is to be charged. 
  The two new commercial banks described above are among the best banks 
in the republic. The financial situation of the others is not as good, a fact which The Banking System in Kyrgyzstan 
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results from the lack of adjustments in their operating principles. They have 
small levels of own funds and a low level of deposits in accounts held by 
enterprises and individual persons. This is a result of the situation of 1993 in 
which the interest rate on deposits remained far below the rate of inflation. As a 
result, enterprises as well as the population at large withdrew money from the 
banks, and many firms engaged in transactions outside the banking system. The 
total deposits of enterprises and individual persons in all banks amounted to 80 
million soms by the end of 1993. The majority of banks lacked significant funds 
for the carrying out of credit operations and merely increased the demand for 
central bank credits. Analysis of data gathered by the central bank shows that the 
83 percent of funds distributed as credit by commercial banks in 1993 consisted 
of loans acquired on the interbank market (mainly refinancing credit). About 15 
percent came from the deposits of enterprises and 2 percent from deposits of 
individual persons. With such a structure of sources of credit funds, commercial 
banks are dependent to a tremendous extent on the principles by which the 
central bank allocates refinancing credit. On the other hand, their financial 
situation also depends on their own credit policies and on the conditions of the 
enterprises they finance. In both of these spheres there was a significant crisis, 
which in turn adversely affected the situation of the banking system. 
  In the majority of commercial banks, decapitalization occurred in 1993. 
The inflation rate in that year has been assessed at 1465 percent. On the other 
hand the capital base of all commercial banks rose during that time only sixfold. 
Only in three cases did commercial banks increase their capital bases sufficiently 
to keep up with inflation. These were, however, small banks with small starting 
capitals. In the remaining banks, including the three largest, real capital bases 
were reduced by at least 50 percent. 
  A further problem of the commercial banks is the quality of their credit 
portfolios. This have been worsening continually in connection with the 
declining tendency of production in 1993 and 1994. The breaking of the 
cooperation networks which had existed in the Soviet system caused production 
declines in several branches of industry of up to 20 percent (in the machine 
industry for example) or caused the complete halt of production (as in the case of 
most firms in the defense industry). In this situation the amount of overdue 
credits in the banks' credit portfolios has grown tremendously. However, the 
exact proportion of lost and doubtful credits in these portfolios is difficult to 
determine. According to the estimates of the supervision authority of the central 
bank it varies from bank to bank from 5 percent to 90 percent. It is also known 
that the most difficult situation is faced by the two largest banks 
(Kyrgyzagroprombank and Kyrgyzpromstroibank) and results from the poor 
situation of the enterprises they have traditionally financed. 
  Several new commercial banks are in a similarly poor situation. A partial 
review of the credit portfolios of 10 new commercial banks by the supervision 
authority shows that in four of them the share of lost or doubtful credits in their K. Kloc 
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loan portfolios lies between 30 and 80 percent. In the opinion of the supervisory 
authority the reasons for this situation are as follows: 
- when extending credits banks have not sufficiently investigated the 
financial situation of their clients. The balances of the enterprises 
borrowing from the banks were not analyzed in most cases, and clients 
thus obtained credits in amounts many times greater than their own funds. 
- when accepting securities for loans, banks very frequently applied the 
practice of accepting insurance from insurance firms chosen by 
themselves. In certain commercial banks this was the only means of 
security for up to 90 percent of all loans (for example in AKB Energobank 
or Merkurybank). These methods of insuring loans increased the risk of 
their loss, as the insurance firms are not able to simultaneously and fully 
cover the value of all objects insured. 
- the method of insuring loans by taking liens (on goods, buildings, and 
machines), which has been resorted to more and more frequently, has met 
with serious difficulties in implementation. These have been caused by 
high taxes and legal limitations (contained for example in the civil code). 
- bank head offices have engaged in supervision of the activities of their 
branches only to a small extent. In many cases branches, enjoying the 
freedom to award credits, did not observe the rules and limitations set by 
the head office. 
  These factors discussed in the supervisory authority's analysis do not 
include one very important reason for the worsening of the loan portfolios of 
commercial banks. The roots of this problem lie in the old system of economic 
central planning and the continuation of the policy of "soft" credits for 
enterprises even after the introduction of economic reforms. Central bank credits 
were allocated according to the instructions of the parliament with the provision 
of various types of preferences and discounts. In addition, large banks added 
special preferential provisions of their own for their shareholders. At the same 
time there was a lack of mechanisms and activities forcing enterprises to make 
structural changes. Commercial banks  continued the practice of financing 
enterprises regardless of whether those enterprises were making losses or had any 
development prospects. This led to the situation in which firms lost the ability to 
pay off their loans. 
6. The crisis of the banking system in Kyrgyzstan 
  The situation described above led to the inability in the autumn of 1993 of 
almost all commercial banks to repay refinancing credits borrowed from the 
central bank. The debts of commercial banks to the central bank rose to nearly 
600 million soms. As a result, the NBK cut off refinancing credit for commercial The Banking System in Kyrgyzstan 
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banks. Central bank funds were distributed solely on the instruction of the 
government and the parliament. The unavailability of refinancing credit left the 
commercial banks in a difficult position. In the search for a solution to this 
problem some paid high interest rates on deposits (up to 300 percent on a-vista 
accounts). This resulted in an influx of deposits by individual persons but also 
increased the banks' obligations to their depositors. The situation in which 
commercial banks set the rate of interest on deposits independently occurred for 
the first time since the beginning of the reforms of the banking system. This 
essential change in the policy of the banks cannot, however, alter their financial 
situation in the short term. 
  In November, 1993, the NBK created a special commission to supervise 
the use of credit by banks and activities intended to insure the punctual payment 
of obligations to the central bank. The banks were obligated to systematically 
inform the NBK of their decisions concerning the use of assets (in the form of 
repayments to the NBK and sales of foreign currency, treasury bills, or 
securities). Thus, they were to actively engage in measures assuring the 
repayment of credits and the liquidation of overdue debts (collection of liens and 
loan securities). 
  After several months of activity the situations of specific commercial 
banks were very differentiated. AK Vneshekonombank and Kurulushbank were 
in the best situation, having liquidated their debts to the central bank. AKB 
Kyrgyzdyikanbank, Urmatbank, and AKB Aknet remained in very difficult 
situations. The situation of the three large commercial banks worsened. The share 
of overdue debts in their loan portfolios continued to grow, and their debts to the 
NBK amounted to 575 million soms by the beginning of 1994. Their problems 
can only be solved under the condition that the enterprises indebted to them 
undertake decisive restructuring activities. The monitoring of the 140 largest 
debtor enterprises was introduced with this aim. Over 30 of the enterprises in this 
group have been judged to lack prospects for finding markets for their products. 
The World Bank has drawn up a program for the reorganization, liquidation, and 
privatization of these enterprises, allocating 60 million dollars for this purpose. A 
special agency has been created which, carrying out necessary restructuring, will 
simultaneously buy the debt of these enterprises to the banks. The program 
drawn up by the World Bank for 30 enterprises became the model for similar 
programs to be drawn up for the remaining group of several dozen enterprises. 
This creates a long-term prospect for improving the situation of the largest 
commercial banks. 
  The crisis of the banking system was additionally caused by the fact that 
the NKB for the first time undertook decisive activity toward the new banks in 
the worst situation. Two banks were stripped of their licenses. Zyrgalbank lost its 
license because its starting capital amounted to only 100 thousand soms and there 
was no prospect for its increase (the required minimum at the end of 1993 was 
one million soms and was raised at the beginning of 1994 to 5 million). K. Kloc 
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Urmatbank lost its license because its loan portfolio was composed almost solely 
of lost or doubtful loans and it was not able to fulfil its obligations either to the 
central bank or to its clients. Moreover, the central bank either warned or fined 
three other banks (AKB Saturn, AK Kyrgyzenergobank, and AK 
Kyrgyzdyikanbank). 
  In connection with the situation in the banking system the NKB drew up 
new instructions and regulations concerning commercial banks which included 
the following: 
- an increase in the fine (up to double the interest rate) for maintaining a 
negative balance on the bank's account with the central bank, 
- the regulation that the amount of overdue debts to the central bank may 
not exceed the capital base of the bank, 
- the regulation that a commercial bank must liquidate its debt within the 
period of three successive credit auctions, 
- the regulation that if the so-called overdraft is not liquidated within that 
period of time the NBK may take the following actions: 1. exclude from, 
or limit access to, all credit auctions; 2. subject the bank to a fine; 3. 
deprive the bank of the license to carry out foreign currency operations; 4. 
order the bank to increase its capital; 5. order the bank to pay dividends on 
all shares; 6. replace the management of the bank; 7. deprive the bank of 
its license to carry out banking activity. 
  These decisions and activities of the central bank, caused by the crisis of 
the commercial banks, show at the same time that the reform of the banking 
system in Kyrgyzstan is entering the second stage, of which the most important 
goal is the introduction in commercial banks of rules and principles of 
functioning in accordance with the rules of the market economy. 
7. Conclusions from the analysis of the current situation of 
the banking system 
  Progress in the realization of the stabilization program and especially the 
reduction of the inflation rate has brought about growing problems in the 
banking system. The solution of these problems requires time and significant 
external assistance. New demands face the central bank and the commercial 
banks, which in practice lead to the introduction and compliance with market 
rules of the functioning of the economy and the banking system. 
  In the first order of importance, this situation demands of the central bank 
the strengthening of the institution of banking supervision as well as the 
increasingly rigorous execution of already formulated rules and principles The Banking System in Kyrgyzstan 
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concerning the commercial banks. The central bank plans to audit the majority of 
commercial banks this year. It will be equally necessary to restructure the 
commercial banks in the worst situations. Activities have already been 
undertaken to suspend the activities of some small banks. In one case this has led 
to the closing and liquidation of a bank. The largest problems, however, are 
associated with the largest banks, in which the largest quantity of bad debts is 
concentrated. In this situation the development of methods of restructuring of the 
commercial banks and the enterprises indebted to them will be indispensable. 
The first steps in this direction have been taken with the help of the World Bank, 
which plans to dispense assistance credits for restructuring and the solution of the 
debt problem of the thirty most indebted enterprises. 
  Besides the strengthening of banking supervision, the central bank should 
concentrate on the conduct of monetary policy and turn over responsibility for 
the realization of credit allocation policy to commercial banks and the authorities 
responsible for carrying out the government's industrial policy. This demands the 
consistent execution of the rule that to an increasingly large extent the 
refinancing credit of the central bank be allocated according to the auction 
system. 
  In the nearest future changes will also be necessary in the banking 
legislation making it possible to institute the administration by commissioner of 
banks in particularly difficult situations, implement structural reforms including 
the mergers of banks, and increase requirements concerning the structures of 
credit portfolios. 
  With respect to commercial banks it will be necessary to change their 
operating principles. The development of a minimal standard of data in credit 
applications which would include information on the financial situation of the 
prospective borrower seems to be of the utmost importance. Furthermore, the 
autonomy of branches should be limited. Commercial banks should also change 
the structures of their credit portfolios within a specified period of time in such a 
way as to decrease the maximum allowable amount of credit for a single 
borrower (in relation to the capital base) as well as to reduce the share of credits 
allocated to shareholders in the total credit portfolio. They should also be 
obligated to greater participation in the solution of problems of enterprises which 
have lost liquidity in the fulfilment of their obligations to the bank. 
  The implementation of these changes in the banking system and their 
coordination with economic and fiscal policy as well as structural reform can 
improve the prospect for progress on the path toward a market economy. 
 
 
 K. Kloc 
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